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BOOK NOTES
causes and also those by a referee are the subject of respective chapters of
equal merit with the subjects already mentioned. Seventy-nine pages alone are
devoted to motions for new trials, dealing with those before the trial judge, at
Special Term and in the Appellate Court. As in the preceding volumes of this
set, each subject is illustrated by an appropriate form of pleading where such
be possible. This volume contains the same admirable footnotes and citations
of authority as did its predecessors. Like them it is couched in language that is
easily read and as readily to be understood by the law student as the more
experienced legalistic mind. It constitutes a contribution of real worth to the
subject of which it treats.
CHARLES

E.

RUSSELL.

New York City.

BOOK NOTES
CONVICTING THE INNOcENT.

By Edwin M. Borchard, with the collaboration of

E. Russell Lutz. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1932, pp. XXIX, 421.
In view of the agitation created by Harriet Beecher Stowe's "Uncle Tom's
Cabin," which some historians credit with the Emancipation Proclamation, and
Charles Dickens' novels dealing with the English debtors' prisons and the
subsequent abolition of such prisons, it is more than probable that the proposals
outlined by Professor Borchard in this book will be eagerly used as a tocsin by
political office-seekers throughout the country within the next few years. There
is undoubtedly a powerful move of liberal influence sweeping the legislative
leaders before it, and when as in this instance such renowned liberals as Felix
Frankfurter and John H. Wigmore lend their support, the probabilities of its
eventual adoption as a legal recourse are greatly increased.
Professor Borchard presents this proposition: "The state must necessarily
prosecute persons legitimately suspected of crime; but when it is discovered
after conviction that the wrong man was condemned, the least the state can do
to right this essentially irreparable injury is to reimburse the innocent victim,
by an appropriate indemnity, for the loss and damage suffered. European
countries have long recognized that such indemnity is a public obligation.
Federal and state governments in the United States ought to adopt the same
policy, instead of merely releasing the innocent prisoner from custody by
pardoning him for a crime he never committed and without any admission of
error or public vindication of his character." Some states do have such laws,
but the majority do not. Whether one approves of such indemnification
depends on one's philosophy of the relation of law to society, and on such a
subject libraries can be written; it will suffice this reviewer to say that he is
entirely in accord with Professor Borchard's proposal, but not because of the
evidence presented in the sixty-five cases collated in this book.
Three of these sixty-five cases (two English and one Scotch) are taken
from the Reports of foreign countries, and severely weaken the authors' evi-
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dence by causing them to appear hard pressed for material, whereas, in reality,
these three cases were introduced to show that the weakness of our judicial
system also exists in the countries from which we adopted it. An analysis of
these sixty-five cases reveals the following interesting data:
(1) In twenty-nine cases the convictions were obtained mainly on
the basis of the testimony of witnesses who later were proven to have
been mistaken in their identification of the defendants, although it must
be admitted that the defendants' reputations contributed somewhat to
their convictions.
(2) In one case of mistaken identification the witness recanted
before trial and the accused was discharged.
(3) In thirteen cases the convictions were due to perjury by witnesses. Here, again, the defendants' reputations contributed to their
convictions in two cases.
(4) In six cases the convictions were due to circumstantial evidence, but in two of these cases the defendants' reputations contributed
to their convictions.
(5) In five cases no crime had been committed, but due to public
sentiment had to be held, and due to perjury by witnesses in three cases
and the defendants' reputations in the other two cases, convictions were
obtained.
(6) In four cases public sentiment again caused the convictions of
innocent defendants, but in these instances a crime had been committed.
(7) In four cases the convictions were obtained mainly by "expert"
testimony. In one case the only witness was an "expert"; in the other
three cases the "expert" was assisted by either circumstance, perjury, or
mistaken identity.
(8) In only three cases were the convictions due mainly to the
efforts of corrupt public officials. In one case, the Icie Sands case, solely
by the testimony of a corrupt police official; in the other two cases the
officials suppressed evidence and allowed the defendants to be mistakenly
identified by the witnesses for the state.
Fortunately, for" the consciences of the members of the juries convicting these
persons, none of them were executed, although in one case the defendant owes
his life to the mechanical ignorance of the hangman and an aroused populace.
The reviewer feels that the cases outlined in this book form the nucleus
of a better argument against the present-day jury system of trying cases, than
an argument for the indemnification of unjustly convicted innocent persons.
JIMMY WALKER, THE STORY OF A PERSONALITY.

By Louis J. Gribetz and

Joseph Kaye. New York: Lincoln MacVeagh, The Dial Press, 1932,
pp. 351.
In the annals of legislative inquiries, it is doubtful if there ever was one
more widely discussed or more celebrated than the recent hearings concerning
former Mayor Walker. The interest aroused, and the bitter partisanship engen-

